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1 
Stakeholder Theory from a Management Perspective: Bridging the 
Shareholder/Stakeholder Divide 
Victoria Schnure Baumfield 
The law literature posits a wide chasm between the standard doctrine of shareholder 
primacy/shareholder wealth maximisation and stakeholder theory.  In so doing, the 
law literature largely ignores the contribution of our colleagues in the fields of 
management and business ethics, many of whom conceive of stakeholder theory as 
an essential part of the good management necessary to maximise shareholder 
wealth.  This article reviews major contributions from the management literature and 
explains how they can help lawyers understand the proper role that consideration of 
stakeholder interests should play in management decision making.  It argues that 
stakeholder theory as conceived by the management theorists broadly aligns with 
the legal concept of enlightened shareholder value and does not conflict with the 
shareholder wealth maximisation objective as currently understood under dominant 
paradigms of Anglo-Australian corporate law.  To the contrary, stakeholder theory 
supports shareholder wealth maximisation, because shareholder and stakeholder 
interests are symbiotic.  It is impossible to realise shareholder value without taking 
care of stakeholders.  At the extreme, where a company is harmed by a failure to 
adequately consider and take steps to mitigate the impact of corporate decisions or 
policies on stakeholders, that failure could potentially attract plausible claims that 
responsible directors and officers have breached their directors’ duties as those 
duties are currently defined in Australian law.  The article concludes that the 
management literature assists in bridging the divide between shareholder primacy 
and stakeholder theory because it provides robust support for the contention that 
considering the impact of corporate decisions on stakeholders and actively seeking 
mutually beneficial solutions will ultimately enhance shareholder wealth in anything 
longer than the short term. 
I. Introduction
Stakeholder theorists argue that the company has obligations not just to 
shareholders but to the other groups that are affected by its conduct, and that 
companies should accordingly be managed in a way that maximises outcomes for all 
 Assistant Professor, Bond University Faculty of Law and PhD Candidate, TC Beirne
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stakeholders.  This view has been known by names including stakeholder theory,1 
stakeholder capitalism,2 stakeholder management3 and the social entity view.4   
 
Although its concepts in embryonic form can be traced back to Berle and Means and 
even Adam Smith, modern stakeholder theory is widely considered to have been 
born with the publication of business ethicist R. Edward Freeman’s seminal 1984 
work, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach.5  Freeman argued that it was 
not only morally correct for businesses to take into account how their activities would 
affect their stakeholders, but that it was also strategically in their interest to do so.  
Since then, academic consideration of stakeholder theory has lured theorists from 
disciplines as diverse as corporate law, business management, organisational theory, 
network theory, public administration and business ethics.   
 
Nevertheless, the law literature on stakeholder theory rarely refers to developments 
from other disciplines.  That is unfortunate, because insights from other disciplines, 
in particular the management literature, suggest that the divide between stakeholder 
perspectives and shareholder primacy is not as wide as many law theorists seem to 
assume.  In fact, the management literature persuasively makes the case that 
shareholder and stakeholder interests are so interrelated as to be inseparable, at 
least over the medium to long term.  Theories that posit an irreconcilable conflict 
between shareholders and stakeholders in the corporate enterprise are based on a 
flawed premise: a rejection of the essential symbiosis between the two.    
 
This article, therefore, reviews the management literature and considers how its 
theoretical developments may contribute to law’s understanding of the proper 
consideration to be given to corporate stakeholders.  It does so as follows:  Part II 
contains a detailed discussion of key contributions to the management literature 
(including the sub-disciplines of both strategic management and business ethics) on 
stakeholder theory.  Within Part II, Part II.A examines definitional issues in 
determining who should be considered a corporate stakeholder and the implications 
of using a particular definition.  Part II.B examines how an understanding of the 
power relationships arising from the interdependent nature of stakeholder interests 
may help corporations accomplish their profit objective while simultaneously serving 
the interests of stakeholders.  Part II.C considers stakeholder salience principles, 
                                                 
1 Thomas Donaldson and Lee E Preston, 'The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications' (1995) 20(1) The Academy of 
Management Review 65; Michael C Jensen, 'Value Maximization, Stakeholder 
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function' (2011) 14(3) Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 8. 
2 R Edward Freeman, Kirsten Martin and Bidhan Parmar, 'Stakeholder Capitalism' 
(2007) 74 Journal of Business Ethics 303. 
3 John R Boatright, 'What's Wrong – and What's Right – with Stakeholder 
Management' in Denis Gordon Arnold, Tom L Beauchamp and Norman E Bowie 
(Eds), Ethical Theory and Business, 9th ed, Pearson, Upper Saddle River, 2013, p 69. 
4 William T Allen, 'Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation' (1992) 
14 Cardozo LR 261 at 265. 
5 R Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Pitman, 
Boston,1984 (‘Strategic Management’). 
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which explain why certain stakeholders receive (or should receive) more corporate 
attention than others.  Part III argues that stakeholder theory as conceived by the 
management theorists broadly aligns with the legal concept of enlightened 
shareholder value and does not conflict with the shareholder wealth maximisation 
objective as currently understood under dominant paradigms of Anglo-Australian 
corporate law.  To the contrary, the accommodation of stakeholder interests is a 
prerequisite to the maximisation of shareholder wealth over anything longer than the 
short term.  Moreover, Part III argues, where a company is harmed by a failure to 
adequately consider and take steps to mitigate the impact of corporate decisions or 
policies on stakeholders, that failure could potentially attract plausible claims that 
responsible directors and officers have breached their duties to act in good faith in 
the best interest of the company under general law and s 181(1)(1) of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’) as well as their duty of care at 
general law and under s 180(1) of the Corporations Act.  Part III also considers 
criticisms of stakeholder theory and responds from a management literature context.  
Part IV concludes. 
 
II. The Management Literature 
A. Stakeholder Identification: Who Is a Stakeholder? 
Stakeholders can be defined in a number of different ways, but the classic definition 
as originally formulated by Freeman holds that an organisation’s stakeholders are 
‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organisation’s objectives’.6   Under a narrow view, stakeholders might be limited to 
‘those groups without whose support, the business would cease to be viable’.7  Such 
stakeholders, who in many cases will be directly engaged in transactions with the 
firm, can be referred to as ‘primary stakeholders’.8  In Freeman’s famous ‘wheel 
diagram’, for example, he lists customers, employees, suppliers, financiers 
(encompassing both shareholders and creditors such as bank lenders and 
bondholders) and communities9 as primary stakeholders.10  A broader view (but still 
                                                 
6 Ibid, at p 46.  See generally Ronald K Mitchell, Bradley R Agle and Donna J Wood, 
'Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of 
Who and What Really Counts' (1997) 22 Academy of Management Review 853 at 
858, which contains a helpful table chronologically listing how the definition of 
‘stakeholder’ has evolved. 
7 Freeman, Strategic Management, above n 5, at p 63. 
8 See, eg, Max E. Clarkson, 'A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating 
Corporate Social Performance' (1995) 20(1) Academy of Management Review 92, at 
105-7 (‘Stakeholder Framework’) ; Freeman, Strategic Management, above n 5,at p 
62; Amy J. Hillman and Gerald D. Keim, 'Shareholder Value, Stakeholder 
Management, and Social Issues: What's the Bottom Line?' (2001) 22(2) Strategic 
Management Journal 125 at 126-7. 
9 For a discussion of the various ways that ‘community’ can be defined in the context 
of stakeholder theory, see Laura Dunham, R Edward Freeman and Jeanne Liedtka, 
'Enhancing Stakeholder Practice: A Particularized Exploration of Community' (2006) 
16(1) Business Ethics Quarterly 23. 
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not as broad as Freeman’s original formulation) ‘captures the idea that if a group or 
individual can affect a business, then the executives must take that group into 
consideration in thinking about how to create value.’11  Parties other than primary 
stakeholders who fall into this conception can be referred to as ‘secondary 
stakeholders’.  Examples of secondary stakeholders can include consumer advocate 
groups, special interest groups such as environmentalists, the media, government, 
competitors, and even unpleasant actors such as terrorists.12  Such groups might not 
transact directly with the corporation, but can ‘cause significant damage’ if not dealt 
with in one way or another.13 
 
In yet another variation, Clarkson has classified stakeholders as those who 
voluntarily or involuntarily bear risk from the firm’s activities. 14   The basis for 
stakeholder status here is the fact that such entities have a legitimate moral or legal 
claim on the firm, as opposed to the fact that they might be able to influence the 
firm’s behaviour.15  Mitchell et al observe that ‘[t]he use of risk to denote stake 
appears to be a way to narrow the stakeholder field to those with legitimate claims, 
regardless of their power to influence the firm or the legitimacy of their relationship to 
the firm’.16  They warn, however, that focussing on legitimacy can blind one to who 
really has power and influence.   
 
Hill and Jones define stakeholders as ‘groups of constituents who have a legitimate 
claim on the firm’ as established through the existence of an exchange relationship 
with the firm whereby stakeholders provide the firm with critical resources and in 
exchange ‘expect[] [their] interests to be satisfied (by inducements)’.17  Under this 
formulation, even as diffuse a construct as a local community may qualify because 
they ‘provide the firm with locations, a local infrastructure, and perhaps favourable 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 Freeman, Strategic Management, above n 5, at p 62; Clarkson, Stakeholder 
Framework, above n 8, at p 106. 
11 Freeman, Strategic Management, above n 5, at p 63. Stakeholder effects on the 
organization can take various forms including social, political, and economic effects.   
12 Ibid, at p 62; Clarkson, Stakeholder Framework, above n 8, at p 107. 
13 Clarkson, Stakeholder Framework, above n 8, at p 107. 
14 Max Clarkson, 'A Risk Based Model of Stakeholder Theory', in Max B E Clarkson 
(Ed), Proceedings of the Second Toronto Conference on the Stakeholder Theory of 
the Corporation, Centre for Corporate Social Performance & Ethics, University of 
Toronto, Toronto,1994 (‘Risk Based Model of Stakeholder Theory’); see also Mitchell, 
Agle and Wood, above n 6, 856-57. 
15 See, eg, Mitchell, Agle and Wood, above n 6, at 859, 861. 
16 Ibid 857 (emphasis in original). 
17 Charles WL Hill and Thomas M Jones, 'Stakeholder-Agency Theory' (1992) 29(2) 
Journal of Management Studies 131 at 133.  For a narrower version of this concept 
consistent with the property rights branch of economics, see, eg, Peter G Klein et al, 
'Who Is in Charge?  A Property Rights Perspective on Stakeholder Governance' 
(2012) 10(3) Strategic Organization 304 (‘focussing on stakeholders with property 
rights arising from co-investment with shareholders under the reasonable 
expectation of mutual return’). 
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tax treatment’ in exchange for the expectation that the firm will ‘enhance and/or … 
not damage the quality of life’.18   
 
For strategic planning purposes, Freeman illustrates that it is useful to identify 
stakeholders with much greater specificity than is seen in most theoretical 
discussions.19  For example, in the case of a government-owned water supplier, a 
stakeholder map could be drawn in which customers could be broken out as 
residential customers with low water consumption, residential customers with high 
consumption, residential customers on modest incomes, industrial customers, 
agricultural customers, etc.  The government relationship could be broken down to 
include governmental owners, the responsible minister, responsible department, 
relevant regulators, relevant tax offices, etc.  The local community can be broken 
down to include local government officials, local customers, relevant consumer 
advocates, other local community organisations, relevant special interest groups 
such as water conservationists, local media, etc.   
 
Further complicating the analysis, a particular person may wear multiple hats.  For 
example, a government official may also be interested as a customer, a political 
party member, or as an owner of the relevant organisation.20  The ‘multi-dimensional’ 
nature that stakes may take makes it all the more important that firms conduct 
adequate investigations about stakeholders’ needs and concerns rather than just 
assuming that they know the answer based on the obvious.  For example, they can 
‘undertake a validation process using interviews, surveys, the public record, 
interviews with internal boundary spanners who are stakeholder experts, etc.’21 
 
Based on all of the above, the literature suggests that corporate managers should 
conduct detailed stakeholder audits to understand who their stakeholders are and 
the contents of their concerns.  Doing so is an essential part of strategic 
management. 
 
B. The Firm-Stakeholder Relationship 
Freeman argues that ‘stakeholder interests are joint’. 22   By this, he means that 
because the firm cannot survive if its stakeholders’ interests are not attended to, it is 
in all stakeholders’ interests (including shareholders’) that each stakeholder group’s 
interests be accommodated.  Greenfield, for example, illustrates why it is in the 
company’s best interests to take employees’ interests into account in management 
decisions.23  Where stakeholder interests seem to conflict, Freeman suggests that 
managers should ‘rethink the problems so that these interests can go together, so 
                                                 
18 Hill and Jones, above n 17, at 133. 
19 See, eg, Freeman, Strategic Management, above n 5, at p 56 (listing examples of 
‘Specific Stakeholders in a Very Large Organization’). 
20 Ibid, at p 59. 
21 Ibid, at p 95. 
22 Freeman, Strategic Management, above n 5, at p 65. 
23 Kent Greenfield, 'Defending Stakeholder Governance' (2008) 58 Case Western 
Reserve LR 1043 at 1057-9.  While this source is written from a law perspective, it is 
a good example of Freeman’s point. 
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that even more value can be created for each’ even though there will nevertheless 
be times where trade-offs are inevitable.24   
 
A useful insight from Strategic Management and Freeman’s later writings is his 
identification of how stakeholders interact not just with the company but with each 
other.  Far from being isolated actors in dyadic relationships with the company, 
stakeholders often create explicit or implicit networks or ‘coalitions’ with each other to 
accomplish mutual objectives.25  Such alliances might arise based on the perceived 
political, economic, or social effects of an organisation’s conduct on a stakeholder’s 
interests.26   
 
Frooman similarly explored the notion of stakeholders working in combination and 
with third parties to influence firms.27  In an article that discussed how stakeholders 
can gain and use power to achieve their objectives, he identified three ways to exert 
power: resource control (the withdrawal from the firm of critical resources),28 usage 
strategies (where the resource continues to be supplied, but with strings attached), 
and influence pathways, which include either a direct application of the relevant 
strategy by the stakeholder itself (where it is able to do so) or indirect action, where 
more powerful allies are brought in to assist the stakeholder to attain its objective.  
While stakeholders with control over a critical resource may effectively exert 
influence by credibly threatening to withhold that resource or only agreeing to supply 
it if the firm complies with certain conditions, other stakeholders may nevertheless 
create power and hence influence by developing relationships with others who 
supply resources to the firm.  For example, consumers may gain an influential voice 
if they gain the attention of the media.  As Hill and Jones point out, ‘[n]ewsworthy 
publicity comes cheap, yet it can severely damage managerial reputations’.29  This 
illustrates the point that ‘withholding and usage do not have to be performed by a 
stakeholder but, instead, could be performed by an ally of the stakeholder with whom 
the focal firm has a dependence relationship.’30 
   
Others have also explored the relationship of power to stakeholder influence.  
Goodpaster observed that when firms undertake a strategic review of how their 
stakeholders can affect the firm (what he terms a ‘strategic stakeholder synthesis’), 
certain stakeholders are given priority because of their ability to affect the firm, for 
example ‘through political action or opposition to necessary regulatory clearances’. 31  
In other words, when stakeholders have power, the firm has no choice but to deal 
                                                 
24 Freeman, Strategic Management, above n 5, at p 64. 
25 See, eg, ibid, at pp 58, 135. See also TJ Rowley, 'Moving Beyond Dyadic Ties: A 
Network Theory of Stakeholder Influence' (1997) 22 Academy of Management 
Review 887. 
26 See, eg, Freeman, Strategic Management, above n 5, at pp 92-5. 
27 Jeff Frooman, 'Stakeholder Influence Strategies' (1999) 24(2) Academy of 
Management Review 191. 
28 See also Hill and Jones, above n 17, at 141 (discussing ‘exit as a deterrent’). 
29 Hill and Jones, above n 91Ibid, at 142. 
30 Frooman, above n 27, at 198. 
31 Kenneth E Goodpaster, 'Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis' (1991) 1(1) 
Business Ethics Quarterly 53 at 57-8; see also Frooman, above n 27, at 192. 
Accepted author manuscript.  Published as (2016) 31 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 
187 
 
7 
 
with them.  Other stakeholders may be affected by the firm’s conduct but 
nevertheless ignored if they have (or, more accurately, are perceived to have) 
relatively little power to affect the firm. 32   Goodpaster notes that arguments to 
consider these stakeholders’ interests would tend to arise on moral or ethical 
grounds, rather than strategic ones.  (Frooman therefore referred to the latter group 
as ‘moral stakeholders’.33) 
 
Freeman calls this dichotomy that is commonly assumed to exist between strategic 
and moral concerns the ‘Separation Fallacy’ or ‘Separation Thesis’.  He argues that 
once one realises that stakeholders’ interests are joint, it becomes clear that there 
can be no distinction between strategic and moral concerns; they are interdependent.  
As such, ‘every business decision is an ethical decision’ and ought to be treated as 
such. 34  Moreover, ethical decision-making is strategic because it creates value for 
the firm.35   
 
Goodpaster disagrees that all stakeholder concerns are inherently strategic and thus 
legitimate bases for corporate decision-making.  He posits the following ‘Stakeholder 
Paradox’:  ‘It seems essential, yet in some ways illegitimate, to orient corporate 
decisions by ethical values that go beyond strategic stakeholder considerations to 
multi-fiduciary ones.’ 36   In other words, while from a normative perspective all 
stakeholders’ interests should be taken into account, so doing would seem to make a 
mockery of the fiduciary duty to the company as it is currently normally understood in 
common law countries.  The ‘multi-fiduciary’ model refers to the notion that 
managers should be required to act in the interests of not only shareholders but of 
some permutation of the organisation’s other stakeholders, in particular its primary 
stakeholders.37  The origins of this view were expressed in Professor Dodd’s famous 
debate with Adolf Berle38 and picked up by Freeman in his older writings, although in 
his more recent writings, Freeman has disclaimed the notion that a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders should be extended to all stakeholders.39  It is clear that in Australia the 
current duty to act in the best interests of the company does not entail a legal 
                                                 
32 Goodpaster, above n 31, at 57. 
33 Frooman, above n 27. 
34 R Edward Freeman et al, Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p 223. 
35 See generally ibid, at pp 262-4. 
36 Goodpaster, above n 31, at 63.   
37 See, eg, Allen, above n 3, at 265.  Allen refers to a conception under which a 
board of directors owes ‘a duty of loyalty, in some sense, to all those interested in or 
affected by the corporation’.  See also Rosemary Langford, 'Directors' Duties: 
Stakeholder Interests - Balancing or Considering?' (2014) 32 C&SLJ 64 at 67 
quoting Paul Redmond, Corporations and Financial Markets Law, 6th Ed, Thomson 
Reuters, Sydney, 2013, at para 2.207. 
38 E Merrick Dodd, Jr, 'For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?' (1932) 45 
Harvard L R 1145. 
39 Freeman et al, above n 34, at p 68 n 14.  As Freeman now explains, ‘We believe 
that such a move cannot be defended without doing damage to the notion of 
“fiduciary”.  The idea of having a special duty to either one or a few stakeholders is 
not helpful.’ 
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obligation to act in the interests of a company’s stakeholders as a whole, even 
though a voluntary decision by the directors of a solvent company to take 
stakeholder interests into account will normally be allowed where some benefit to the 
company can be shown, even if diffuse, indirect, or unquantifiable.40  
  
If one assumes, like Goodpaster, that not all ethical decisions are strategically 
important for the company, perhaps because of the lack of a fiduciary obligation to 
the impacted stakeholder, Goodpaster argues that there is still a way to justify those 
decisions.  He suggests that there still may be a moral obligation to the affected 
party even if that obligation is not fiduciary.  Social obligations embodying community 
standards ‘not rooted in the fiduciary relationship, but in other relationships at least 
as deep’41 generally expect human beings to act ethically to each other.  We do not 
countenance community members injuring, defrauding, cheating, stealing from or 
coercing each other.  Companies may not be human, but they are run by humans.  
Indeed, as artificial persons, they can be viewed as community members 
themselves.42 Therefore, even if corporate managers are not bound by corporate law 
to respect stakeholders’ interests, it should be accepted that fiduciary obligations to 
shareholders ‘are subject to moral criteria in their execution.’43 
 
By interposing morals into the calculation, Goodpaster’s view creates a theoretical 
framework for organisations to take stakeholder interests into account without the 
need for government involvement.  So does Freeman’s, through his Separation 
Fallacy.  Indeed, Freeman explicitly argues that it is undesirable to ‘rely on the state 
to solve stakeholder conflicts’ because: (1) so doing absolves individuals and 
organisations of their ‘responsibility to conduct business within community norms’; (2) 
government solutions inevitably have unintended consequences that make matters 
worse, without the ability to easily make small changes to correct course; (3) 
‘individuals and organisations [will] never develop the imagination required to create 
                                                 
40 See, eg, Langford, above n 37; Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 
(CAMAC), The Social Responsibility of Corporations, December 2006, pp 82, 86, 91-
2; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Corporate 
Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating Value, Parliament of Australia, June 
2006, p 53, para 4.40.  See also Shelley Marshall and Ian Ramsay, 'Stakeholders 
and Directors' Duties: Law, Theory and Evidence' (2012) 35(1) UNSWLJ 291 at 292 
(discussing the ‘widely held view . . . that current Australian company law permits 
directors sufficient freedom to pursue stakeholder interests without requiring that 
they do so’); ASX Corporate Governance Council, ASX Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations, 3rd ed, ASX, 2014, p 19.  See generally the 
discussion in Part III, below. 
41 Goodpaster, above n 31, at 67 (emphasis in original). 
42 Indeed, in the United States, they are even entitled to fundamental rights such as 
freedom of speech and in some circumstances freedom of religion.  See Citizens 
United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 (2010) (corporate right to free 
speech under the First Amendment to the US Constitution); Burwell v Hobby Lobby 
Stores Inc, 573 US ___ (2014) (close corporation’s right to religious freedom under 
relevant statute without considering the existence of such a right under the First 
Amendment).  
43 Goodpaster, above n 31, at 67-70. 
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different, mutually beneficial relationships’ and they will turn to the courts to resolve 
disputes instead of learning how to do so themselves; and (4) government is already 
captured by big business, which would manipulate legislative rule-making to their 
advantage.44   
 
Donaldson and Preston, like Goodpaster, reject Freeman’s view that strategic and 
ethical considerations always overlap.  In a significant article, they observed that 
stakeholder theory naturally divides into three strands:  
 
 instrumental stakeholder theory; 
 normative stakeholder theory; and 
 descriptive/empirical stakeholder theory.45 
Instrumental stakeholder theory is comparable to Goodpaster’s notion of strategic 
stakeholders and conceptually is the closest to how stakeholders are treated in 
Australian law today.  It is the notion of paying attention to stakeholders when and 
because it is in the firm’s interest to do so.  Normative stakeholder theory relates to 
the identification of ethical, moral or philosophical guidelines for how companies 
should take their stakeholders’ interests into account.  Most of the normative 
arguments in favour of stakeholder theory are based on fundamental notions of 
fairness and ‘a basic equality among stakeholders in terms of their moral rights as 
these are realised in the firm’, although inequality in treatment may be fair in some 
circumstances.46  Descriptive stakeholder theory examines how companies behave 
towards their stakeholders in practice.   
 
It is useful to understand which approach one is taking because they ‘involve very 
different methodologies, types of evidence, and criteria of appraisal’.47  Nevertheless, 
they are not mutually exclusive and it might be appropriate to construct an argument 
or analysis using multiple approaches.   
 
C. Stakeholder Salience 
Stakeholder salience refers to ‘the degree to which managers give priority to 
competing stakeholder claims.’48  Mitchell et al identified three factors that contribute 
to stakeholder salience: power (defined as ‘the probability that one actor within a 
social relationship would be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance’, 
or the ability of one social actor to get another social actor to do something it would 
not have otherwise done49), legitimacy (the perception or assumption that the actions 
to be taken are desirable, proper or appropriate – ie, the normative basis for acting50) 
                                                 
44 Freeman, Martin and Parmar, above n 2, at 310-11. 
45 Donaldson and Preston, above n 1; see also Freeman et al, above n 34, at p 212. 
46 See, eg, R Edward Freeman, 'The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future 
Directions' (1994) 4(4) Business Ethics Quarterly 409 at 415-16. 
47 Donaldson and Preston, above n 1, at 70. 
48 Mitchell, Agle and Wood, above n 6, at 854. 
49 Ibid, at 865. 
50 Ibid, at 866. 
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and urgency (time sensitivity51).  The ‘relative absence or presence’ of one, two, or 
all three of these factors – which may vary over time – will determine the level of 
priority that managers will give to a given stakeholder claim.52  Furthermore, the 
possession of a given attribute, eg power, ‘does not necessarily imply its actual or 
intended use, nor does possession of power imply consciousness of such 
possession by the possessor or “correct” perception of objective reality by the 
perceivers.’  This last point is significant because unless an entity ‘is aware of its 
power and willing to exercise it on the firm, it is not a stakeholder with high salience 
for managers’.53  The same point can be made where managers do not appreciate 
the extent of an entity’s power.54   
 
Stakeholder salience analysis need not be limited to corporations.  In a useful 
example of how a stakeholder salience analysis works in a different context, De 
Bussy and Kelly investigated stakeholder salience in the context of politics.55  In 
particular, they examined the principles of stakeholder identification (ie, ‘who 
politicians say they should pay attention to in principle’) and stakeholder salience 
(‘who they actually pay attention to in practice’) to see whether politics in Western 
Australia suffered from a democratic deficit, ie ‘the argument that [governmental 
bodies] suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible to the ordinary 
citizen.’56  They determined that while WA politicians believed that they should be 
paying attention to ‘moral’ stakeholders or ‘claimants’ (ie, those affected by the 
government), the stakeholders that WA politicians paid attention to in practice were 
those with the power to affect government (ie, strategic stakeholders), such as the 
media, lobbyists, NGOs, industry groups and trade unions.  The media had power 
because of its ability to set the public agenda, ‘amplify an issue’ and ‘strongly 
influence public opinion’.57  The remaining groups receive attention because of ‘their 
professionalism, high quality representatives and ability to present their point of view 
succinctly’.58  It is hard not to observe that all of those groups also have adequate 
financial resources to press their case, although money, surprisingly, was not 
specifically mentioned as a reason for these groups’ influence.  The ability to make 
political donations was separately noted as a source of power, however.  Conversely, 
‘unorganised groups’ with legitimate claims such as ‘[y]oung people, Australian 
Muslims, Aboriginal people, single parents, stay-at-home mothers, people with 
disabilities, gay and lesbian people, and people living in remote, rural or regional 
areas’ were found to lack power because they ‘lack the resources and skills needed 
to engage consistently in the political process’.59  This led de Bussy and Kelly to 
                                                 
51 Ibid, at 867. 
52 Ibid, at 864. 
53 Ibid, at 868. 
54 Ibid, at 873 (‘managers’ perceptions of stakeholders form the crucial variable in 
determining organizational resource allocation in response to stakeholder claims’). 
55 Nigel M de Bussy and Lorissa Kelly, 'Stakeholders, Politics and Power: Towards 
an Understanding of Stakeholder Identification and Salience in Government' (2010) 
14 Journal of Communication Management 289. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid, at 298. 
58 Ibid, at 299. 
59 Ibid. 
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conclude that ‘there are many groups with legitimate interests who are effectively 
excluded from the consultative process because they are largely unorganised and 
hence lack the power to command the attention of the political elite.’   
 
III. Bridging the Management/Law Divide 
A. Enlightened Shareholder Value 
Stakeholder theory as conceived in the management literature complements and 
overlaps with the legal notion of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ (‘ESV’), also known 
as ‘enlightened self-interest’.  ESV holds that it is in the shareholders’ best interests 
for companies to take stakeholders’ interests into account as part of corporate 
decision-making processes.  As the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services (‘PJC’) explained: 
The enlightened self-interest interpretation of directors’ duties acknowledges 
that investments in corporate responsibility and corporate philanthropy can 
contribute to the long term viability of a company even where they do not 
generate immediate profit.  Under this interpretation directors may consider 
and act upon the legitimate interests of stakeholders to the extent that these 
interests are relevant to the corporation.60 
 
Although taking stakeholder interests into account is not (explicitly) legally required, 
the PJC endorsed ESV as the preferable course for Australian company directors: 
The committee considers that the most appropriate perspective for directors 
to take is that of enlightened self-interest.  Corporations and their directors 
should act in a socially and environmentally responsible manner at least in 
part because such conduct is likely to lead to the long term growth of their 
enterprise.61 
 
In the United Kingdom and most US states,62 ESV has been given legal recognition 
through the adoption of ‘corporate constituency’ or ‘stakeholder’ statutes that either 
allow or require, depending on the jurisdiction, the board to take the constituencies 
listed in the statute into account as part of the directors’ duty of good faith to act in 
the best interests of the company, which in the UK is now framed as the duty to 
promote the ‘success’ of the company. 63   Most stakeholder statutes are merely 
                                                 
60 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, above n  
40, at p 52 para 4.32. 
61 Ibid at p 53 para 4.39. 
62 In the United States, many areas of corporate law are regulated at the state level. 
63 See, eg, Companies Act 2006 (UK) s 172(1) (mandatory); Connecticut Gen Stat § 
33-756(d) (2011) (permissive); Nev Rev Stat § 78.138(4) (2010) (permissive); Ohio 
Rev Code § 1701.59 (2006) (directors ‘shall consider’ shareholders’ interests and 
‘may consider’ the other enumerated factors); NY Bus Corp Law § 717 (2012) 
(permissive); 15 Pa Cons Stat § 516 (2015) (permissive); Haw Rev Stat § 414-221 
(2010) (must consider shareholders and may consider other constituencies).  See 
generally Andrew Keay, 'Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It 
Takes?' (2010) 9 Richmond J Global L and Bus 249 (noting that as of 2012, ‘more 
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permissive, rather than mandatory, and allow directors to consider groups such as 
employees, suppliers, customers, and local communities but do not require it.  Some 
also specify intangible factors such as the long-term consequences of a decision, the 
desirability of a business’s maintaining a good reputation with regard to standards of 
business conduct, and ‘the need to act fairly as between members of the 
company’.64  
 
One of the rare mandatory statutes, section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 (UK), 
states in full: 
 
172  Duty to promote the success of the company 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, 
would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of 
its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) 
to— 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company's employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the 
environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards 
of business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
 
While in the United States constituency statutes have been considered by many 
mainly to give the directors legal cover to resist takeovers (for example by 
considering adverse effects on employees or local communities), most constituency 
statutes are not limited to the takeover context.65  On the other hand, it should be 
noted that these constituency statutes are not a real-life manifestation of the multi-
fiduciary model discussed in Part II.B above because of the differing purpose of why 
stakeholders are to be considered.  Under the multi-fiduciary model, stakeholders 
are considered because it is ethically correct to do so.  Under the ESV model, 
stakeholders are considered because it is in the company’s best interests to do so.   
ESV thus can be viewed as an example of instrumental stakeholderism, as that term 
is defined by Donaldson and Preston.   
 
Conversely, the management literature supports the contention that it is impossible 
for directors to be confident that they are acting in the best interests of the company 
                                                                                                                                                        
than 40’ of the 50 US states had constituency statutes); Lawrence E Mitchell, 'A 
Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes' 
(1992) 70 Texas LR 579. 
64 See, eg, Companies Act 2006 (UK) sub-ss 172(1)(a), (e), and (f). 
65 See, eg, Mitchell, above n 63, at 588-9. 
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where they have not performed an adequate stakeholder analysis and factored the 
results into their management decisions.  If it is no less than a minimally competent 
standard of management for directors to factor stakeholders’ interests into their 
decision making, as the management literature indicates, then directors have at the 
minimum an implicit obligation to do so as part of their duty to act in the best 
interests of the company or perhaps even their duty of care,66 regardless of whether 
that duty is spelled out explicitly in a constituency statute.  
 
The proposition that any competent manager would consider the effects of a 
corporate decision on stakeholders’ interests (and hence on that stakeholder’s future 
interaction with the corporation) as a standard step in the decision-making process 
appears to underlie the reconceived duty of good faith as set forth in s 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006 (UK).  In Australia, the fiduciary and statutory duty to act in 
good faith in the best interests of the company67 has not been specifically modified to 
either allow or require the consideration of stakeholder interests.  The Corporations 
and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) has suggested, however, that 
considering stakeholder interests would not run afoul of s 181 of the Corporations 
Act if it benefits the shareholders as a whole,68 and the PJC agreed that there is 
nothing in the current legislation to inhibit directors from taking account of 
stakeholders other than shareholders.69  Indeed, as discussed above, the PJC has 
endorsed the ESV approach, although the PJC did not go so far as to suggest that 
directors and officers could be in breach of their duty to act in the best interests of 
the company if they ignored the effect of corporate decisions on stakeholders.  But 
that is the logical next step.  There is no logical reason why the managers of a 
company who cause the company harm through their failure to consider or prepare 
for the effect of a decision on a critical stakeholder could not find themselves on the 
wrong side of a claim for breach of directors’ duties.70  In particular, the directors’ 
duty of care and corresponding statutory duty at s 180(1) of the Corporations Act 
uses a reasonable director standard.  If competent management includes the 
consideration of stakeholders in corporate decision making and taking steps to 
mitigate stakeholder harm as a standard component of risk management, then failing 
to do so could be seen as not reasonable.  Conversely, as Langford points out, in 
some cases stakeholders themselves may have standing under s 1324 of the Act to 
                                                 
66 The duty of care might be enlivened if the failure to consider the particular 
stakeholder(s) and consequent effects on the company was not considered 
reasonable. 
67 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 181(1)(a). 
68 CAMAC, above n 40, at pp 82, 86, 91-2; see also Langford, above n 37. 
69 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, above n 
40, at p 53 para 4.40.  
70 For a compelling example in the context of the need to proactively manage for the 
effects of climate change, see Sarah Barker, Directors' Duties in the Anthropocene: 
Liability for Corporate Harm Due to Inaction on Climate Change (December 2013) 
Corporate Law, Economics & Science Association 
http://www.clesa.net.au/blog/2015/1/14/directors-duties-in-the-anthropocene-liability-
for-corporate-harm-due-to-inaction-on-climate-change.  See also Thomas Clarke, 
'The Widening Scope of Directors' Duties: The Increasing Impact of Corporate Social 
and Environmental Responsibility' (2016) 39 Seattle University LR 531. 
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protect their interests from corporate conduct that constitutes a breach of the 
Corporations Act.71  Therefore, far from directors needing to fear liability for choosing 
to consider stakeholders in their decision making, the management literature aligns 
with existing Australian law to suggest that directors might be opening themselves up 
to liability – even under the standard shareholder primacy regime – if they do not do 
so. 
 
B. Stakeholderism and Corporate Social Responsibility 
CSR is notoriously difficult to reduce to a single definition, theory, model, or set of 
objectives. 72   Some conceptions of CSR view it in terms of the shareholder-
stakeholder debate that so dominates corporate law.73  In the sustainability context, 
CSR is often used to refer to the notion of companies voluntarily taking responsibility 
for their impact on society even where those negative externalities do not attract an 
obligation to pay for the harm.74  I term that conception ‘reactive CSR’ because in 
that case companies are reacting to problems they have created.  CSR only refers 
here to companies voluntarily engaging in sustainability and the mitigation of other 
societal issues relevant to their operations, such as for example abuses occurring in 
the context of global supply chains.   
CSR should not be taken to include steps taken as a result of legal obligations to 
prevent or mitigate harm.  In that regard, a growing number of theorists are now 
suggesting that companies have a fundamental, existential obligation to adequately 
plan for and manage sustainability issues in order to avoid breaches of directors’ 
duties as a result of a failure to mitigate risk in this area.75  For example, Barker 
argues that the nascent legal obligation to proactively manage and mitigate risks 
relating to climate change takes obligations with regard to climate change out of the 
realm of CSR or stakeholderism and squarely into directors’ wealth maximisation 
purview.76 
Other definitions of CSR focus on companies voluntarily taking the initiative to 
engage in socially beneficial behaviour with no direct connection to any negative 
impact they may have on society, such as when companies engage in charitable 
endeavours or organise community events simply in order to be (or appear to be) 
                                                 
71 Langford, above n 37, at 67-8.  See also Victoria Schnure Baumfield, 'Injunctions 
and Damages Under s 1324 of the Corporations Act: Will McCracken v Phoenix 
Constructions Revive the Narrow Approach?' (2014) 32 C&SLJ 453 and the 
authorities cited therein. 
72 See generally Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: 
Debates, Models and Practices Across Government, Law and Business, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010, pp 34-42. 
73 Ibid, at p 112. 
74 Eg, ibid, at pp 36-7, 46. 
75 Barker, above n 70; Clarke, above n 70.  
76 Barker, above n 70, 12-13. 
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good corporate citizens or neighbours.77  I will refer to this conduct as ‘philanthropic 
CSR’. 
 
CSR can also be divided into two branches based on what is intended to be 
accomplished.  The first says that companies should engage in CSR because it is in 
the companies’ (and therefore the shareholders’) best interest to do so.78  To the 
extent that CSR is viewed from that perspective, there is a large overlap with what 
Donaldson and Preston classify as instrumental stakeholder theory.79  The second 
branch views CSR as relating not to acting in a socially responsible way because it is 
beneficial for the business to do so but rather as gratuitous behaviour that 
companies should engage in simply because it is the right thing to do (ie, what 
Horrigan terms ‘intrinsic CSR’).80  Intrinsic CSR may encompass both the reactive 
and philanthropic strains of CSR identified in the previous paragraph, and can be 
seen to align with Donaldson and Preston’s definition of normative stakeholder 
theory.   
 
In Australia, although no binding legal duty does this, Principle 3 of the ASX 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations explicitly directs 
companies to act ‘ethically and responsibly’, in a manner that is ‘consistent with the 
reasonable expectations of investors and the broader community’.81  Companies 
listed on the Australian Securities Exchange are expected to comply with the ASX 
Corporate Governance Principles as a general matter unless, under the ‘if not, why 
not’ principle, they explain why they are not complying with particular Principles in 
their publicly-filed annual reports.   
 
The commentary to Principle 3 suggests that companies should be ‘good corporate 
citizens’, including by acting fairly in their dealings with stakeholders such as 
employees, suppliers, customers, and the broader community.  Marshall and 
Ramsay cite Owen J’s statement in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking 
Corporation [No 9] that ‘it does not follow that in determining the content of the duty 
to act in the interests of the company, the concerns of shareholders are the only 
ones to which attention need be directed or that the legitimate interests of other 
groups can safely be ignored’ as evidence that directors may sometimes consider 
stakeholder interests even where the shareholders do not benefit thereby.82  They 
note, however, that under existing case law, except for the insolvency context, where 
                                                 
77 See, eg, Hugh Alexander Grossman, 'Redefining the Role of the Corporation: The 
Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Shareholder Primacy Theory' (2005) 10 
Deakin LR 572 at 581-2 (discussing ‘sincere CSR’).  
78 Ibid, at 579-80 (Grossman refers to this as ‘insincere CSR’). 
79 Indeed, Horrigan terms this ‘instrumental CSR’: Horrigan, above n 72, at p 35. 
80 Ibid, at p 35; Grossman, above n 77, at 581-2 (ie, what Grossman refers to as 
‘sincere CSR’; it may also be referred to as ‘altruistic CSR’). 
81 ASX Corporate Governance Council, above n 40, at p 19 (emphasis added).  See 
also Marshall and Ramsay, above n 40, at 292 (discussing the ‘widely held view . . . 
that current Australian company law permits directors sufficient freedom to pursue 
stakeholder interests without requiring that they do so’). 
82 Marshall and Ramsay, above n 11640, at 298, quoting The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v 
Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] (2008) 39 WAR 1 at 534 paras 4393-4395. 
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creditors’ interests become significant, normally directors can only consider the 
interests of non-shareholder stakeholders ‘with a view to the benefit of the 
shareholders’ – ie, under an instrumental approach.83  None of this contradicts the 
argument in the previous subsection that a consideration of and attempt to 
accommodate stakeholder interests is in fact necessary to ensure that shareholders 
themselves benefit, according to the management literature. 
 
The ability (but not the requirement) for companies to engage in socially responsible 
behaviour has been legally recognised for quite some time now.  For example, in AP 
Smith Manufacturing Co v Barlow, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a 
company’s charitable donation to Princeton University over a shareholder’s objection, 
stating that ‘modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge 
social as well as private responsibilities as members of the communities within which 
they operate.’84  According to Berle, AP Smith illustrated that ‘modern directors are 
not limited to running business enterprise for maximum profit, but are in fact and 
recognised in law as administrators of a community system’.85 
 
AP Smith extended on older English and Australian case law allowing for socially 
responsible behaviour such as Hutton v West Cork Railway Co, in which the court in 
colourful language held that seemingly gratuitous corporate spending was 
permissible where it would ultimately benefit the company,86 and Miles v Sydney 
Meat-Preserving Co Ltd, in which the High Court of Australia allowed a company to 
engage in seemingly altruistic behaviour where the shareholders had agreed to do 
so (and where it was likely in the company’s long-term self-interest).87  The language 
in Miles is instructive.  There, Griffith CJ wrote for the majority that: 
 
The law does not require the members of a company to divest themselves, in 
its management, of all altruistic motives, or to maintain the character of the 
company as a soulless and bowelless thing, or to exact the last farthing in its 
commercial dealings, or forbid them to carry on its operations in a way which 
they think conducive to the best interests of the community as a whole, or a 
substantial part of it, rather than in a way which they think detrimental to such 
interests, though more beneficial (in a pecuniary sense) to themselves.88 
                                                 
83 Marshall and Ramsay, above n 11640, at 298-99.  Interestingly, Marshall and 
Ramsay found based on empirical research that ‘the majority of directors surveyed 
had what might be termed a “stakeholder” understanding of their obligations’: ibid, at  
311. 
84 98 A2d 581 (NJ 1953). 
85 Bryan Horrigan, above n 72, at p 89; see also Adolf A Berle, 'Modern Functions of 
the Corporate System' (1962) 62 Columbia Law Review 433 at 443. See generally 
AA Berle, Jr,  'The Corporation in a Democratic Society' in Melvin Anshen and 
George Leland Bach (eds), Management and Corporations 1985, Greenwood Press, 
Westport,1960, p 63. 
86 (1883) 23 Ch D 654 at 673 (‘The law does not say that there are to be no cakes 
and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the 
benefit of the company ….’). 
87 (1912) 16 CLR 50.   
88 Ibid, at 66. 
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More recent cases have not deviated from this position.  Nor have statements of soft 
law in either the United States or Australia.  In the United States, for example, § 
2.01(b) of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance provides 
that ‘[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the 
corporation, in the conduct of its business … (2) May take into account ethical 
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible 
conduct of business; and (3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public 
welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes’.89  Principle 3 of the 
ASX Corporate Governance Principles, discussed above, gives similar guidance to 
Australian companies, although it does not include similar language explicitly 
authorising companies to make reasonable charitable donations where those 
donations are not seen to benefit shareholders.90 
 
But merely having the latitude to act philanthropically is no longer the issue.  The 
management literature makes clear that supporting corporate stakeholders is not 
mere charity but ‘strategic’, ie, essential to the corporate enterprise. 
   
 
C. Critics of Stakeholder Management: The Shareholder/Stakeholder 
Divide, Revisited 
 
Many corporate law theorists disagree that corporations should be managed in the 
interests of stakeholders, or some permutation thereof, rather than solely for the 
benefit of shareholders.  The shareholder primacy view (also known as shareholder 
wealth maximisation) posits that all stakeholders benefit by a model that places 
shareholders first because shareholders, as residual claimants who receive no fixed 
return on their investment, only benefit to the extent that the firm is managed in a 
way that increases overall wealth.  That is good for all participants in the corporate 
enterprise.91   
 
Because of its focus on the company’s interests, some proponents of shareholder 
primacy implicitly agree with the instrumental stakeholder approach,92 although they 
                                                 
89 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations, 1994, p 55. 
90 ASX Corporate Governance Council, above n 40, at p 19. 
91 There are too many sources for this proposition to list.  For a brief smattering, see, 
eg, Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate 
Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,1991; Stephen M Bainbridge, The New 
Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2008, pp 23 et seq; Reinier Kraakman et al (eds), The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2009; George W Dent, Jr, 'Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse' 
(2008) 58 Case Western Reserve LR 1107. 
92 See, eg, Jensen, above n 1, at 298 although he goes beyond this because he 
explicitly agrees that ‘[a] firm cannot maximise value if it ignores the interest of its 
stakeholders’.  Shareholder primacy theorists may find it significant that this 
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might argue that taking a stakeholder’s needs into account because the firm has no 
choice is not really an application of stakeholder theory at all.  Instead, some 
shareholder primacy proponents seem to define stakeholder theory as only covering 
‘moral stakeholder’ situations, ie, situations where the firm has no strategic interest in 
taking the particular stakeholder need into account although it might be ethical to do 
so.  Indeed, economist Milton Friedman argued that cloaking attention to the needs 
of strategic or instrumental stakeholders under the related term of ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ was ‘hypocritical’ and ‘approaching fraud’.93  But even shareholder 
primacy proponents who accept the obligation to placate strategic or instrumental 
stakeholders would not agree with the normative arguments in favour of stakeholder 
theory, much less the multi-fiduciary model.   
 
Moreover, critics raise concerns about the practicality of actually implementing the 
stakeholder model.  For example, Dent, focussing on employees, suggests a number 
of problems with the fairly common proposal to provide board representation to non-
shareholder stakeholders: 
 
 There is no reason that any particular stakeholder constituency would have a 
greater motivation than shareholders do to take other stakeholders’ concerns 
into account.  For example, in companies that suffered corporate scandals in 
the early 2000s such as Enron and Tyco, employees who were aware of 
corporate wrongdoing did not speak up to warn fellow employees or other 
members of the public not to invest in the company or to sell their shares, or 
to alert law enforcement and stop the misconduct.94 
 
 If stakeholder governance produced greater returns for the corporate entity, 
firms would have voluntarily adopted that model.95 
 
 ‘American organised labor has also shown little interest in board 
representation.  And Europe is moving toward the shareholder model.’96  Dent 
appears to be arguing here that the European model of co-determination 
characterised by employee representation in management is on the decline.  
Indeed, Dent argues that a model that has brought greater harmony between 
management and employee has been the implementation in many firms of 
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), which have brought ‘their interests 
closer to those of the shareholders.’97 
                                                                                                                                                        
admission comes from the same Professor Jensen who authored one of the 
fundamental texts upon which the standard account of the theory of the firm is based: 
Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 
305.   
93 Milton Friedman, 'A Friedman Doctrine - The Social Responsibility of Business is 
to Increase its Profits', The New York Times Magazine (New York), 13 September 
1970, pp 32, 123. 
94 Dent, above n 91, at 1114-15. 
95 Ibid, at 1115. 
96 Ibid, at 1116. 
97 Ibid, at 1117. 
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 If one agrees that stakeholders other than shareholders should have 
representation in management, how would that actually be implemented? It 
would be difficult to establish a fair and legitimate selection process, for 
example, for local communities and for other interest groups.98 
Dent’s arguments, as previously noted, focus on providing stakeholders with board 
representation.  From a management literature perspective on stakeholder theory, 
that argument is to a certain extent beside the point since the wisdom of conducting 
a stakeholder audit and attempting to accommodate stakeholders where feasible is 
conceptually independent from the issue of stakeholder board representation.   
 
That does not obviate the entirety of the criticisms that stakeholder theory has 
attracted, however.  Other commonly voiced concerns include:  
 
 ‘It would be too complex and onerous to expect company directors and 
managers to change the way in which they operate so as to take into account 
interests other than those of shareholders’;99  
 
 ‘Stakeholder theory cannot provide a specific objective function for the 
corporation’;100 and 
 
 If managers or directors are accountable to all stakeholders they will really be 
accountable to none, since any corporate decision could be justified by finding 
some stakeholder who would benefit.  As such, the rule will be unenforceable 
and the true beneficiary of such legal rules is top management itself.101 
These arguments, however, only apply to the multi-fiduciary model, not to ESV, 
which is what the management literature supports.  Rather than expecting corporate 
management to act in the public interest, Dent suggests that the better course is for 
legislatures to legislate if there is particular conduct that we do (or do not) want 
directors to undertake, such as occurs in the context of employment law, 
occupational health and safety, pollution, product liability, etc.  That course is 
preferable because: (1) it would lessen the risk of anarchy arising from allowing 
directors to do whatever they think is socially optimal; and (2) it would also provide 
an easier way to hold directors accountable if they do not comply. 102   Dent is 
certainly correct that specific legislative solutions should be considered where 
particular matters have been causing harm.  But the management literature 
emphasises the constant change with which management must contend.  It would be 
impossible for specific legislation to cover every scenario that directors and officers 
                                                 
98 Ibid, at 1118. 
99 Marshall and Ramsay, above n 40, at 292; Keay, above n 63, at 277-81. 
100 Robert Phillips, R Edward Freeman and Andrew C Wicks, 'What Stakeholder 
Theory is Not' (2003) 13(4) Business Ethics Quarterly 479 at 485. 
101 See, eg, Jonathan R Macey and Geoffrey P Miller, 'Corporate Stakeholders: A 
Contractual Perspective' (1993) 43 U Toronto LJ 401 at 403, 405; Keay, above n 63, 
at 283-4, 293-4; Phillips, Freeman and Wicks, above n 100, at 484. 
102 Dent, above n 91, at 1124. 
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might confront, particularly as new issues arise over time.  Legislation is typically an 
ex post solution that is passed after a problem has manifested and only addresses 
future misconduct.  Stakeholder management principles provide critical guidance to 
fill the gap where legal rules are lacking.   
 
Not even all business ethics theorists agree with the central tenet of stakeholderism 
that companies should be managed for the benefit of stakeholders.  Boatright, for 
example, agrees that corporations should serve the interests of all stakeholders, but 
disagrees that this requires management to act in the interests of all stakeholders.103  
He cites the standard law and economics arguments in favour of deferring to 
shareholders as the corporation’s residual risk-bearers. 104   Further, he argues, 
management need not take particular steps to act in stakeholders’ interests because 
stakeholders have the power to participate in the market to achieve their desires.  By 
this, Boatright appears to be referring to most stakeholders’ power to (1) negotiate in 
their dealings with firms and (2) walk away if they cannot reach satisfactory terms. 
 
Boatright’s argument echoes Macey and Miller, who argue that almost all 
stakeholders can and do protect their interests by contract, and that protecting their 
interests this way rather than by requiring corporate management to serve 
stakeholders’ interests benefits them as well as shareholders.105  That may be true 
for stakeholders such as lenders, suppliers, many customers, and even employees 
(where they have enough leverage to negotiate), but what about local communities?  
Macey and Miller acknowledge that local communities often will not have any 
contract with the firm.  They argue, however, that local communities receive 
adequate protection through the political process and their elected officials, who 
presumably will change the law if corporate conduct threatens to or is harming the 
community.106  Furthermore, they assert, requiring directors to act in the interests of 
the local community will ‘transform[] the role of top managers of public companies 
from that of private businessmen into that of unelected and unaccountable public 
servants.’107  Macey also observes that shareholders can opt out of shareholder 
primacy because they can contractually agree to have stakeholder interests placed 
ahead of shareholders’.  Shareholders can vote to excuse directors from certain 
breaches of contract, and they can similarly mutually agree with other constituencies 
‘that shareholder claims should be subordinated to the claims of nonshareholders.’108 
   
In illustration of how stakeholders can protect themselves by contract, Hill and 
Thomas applied agency theory to the stakeholder issue and suggested that 
stakeholders may use the same principles as are used to align management 
                                                 
103 Boatright, above n 3. 
104 Ibid, at p 72. 
105 Jonathon R Macey, 'An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties' (1991) 21 
Stetson LR 23; Macey and Miller, above n 101. 
106 Eg, Macey and Miller, above n 101, at 421-2. 
107 Ibid, at 422. 
108 Jonathan R Macey, 'Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to 
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective' (1999) 84 
Cornell LR 1266 at 1272-3. 
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interests to a firm’s shareholders.  For example, a stakeholder can offer 
management incentives to act in a desired way, such as the general public (through 
its legislature) offering a company tax breaks to control pollution.  Or stakeholders 
can require the use of a bonding mechanism (ie, ‘credible commitments’), such as a 
consumer who will not make a significant purchase without an adequate warranty 
whereby the manufacturer has committed to providing a certain standard of 
quality.109 
 
As with Dent’s arguments about the ability to legislate on particular matters, the 
arguments that stakeholders can protect themselves by contract or walk away are 
certainly true in some cases, but not in all.  Moreover, once the argument descends 
to advising stakeholders to walk away, the discussion is counterproductive.  A firm 
that alienates key stakeholders is not going to last long, or is going to be forced to 
change, in some cases as a result of the legislative responses to which Dent refers.  
Shareholders’ interests cannot be separated from stakeholder interests.  Over any 
time horizon long enough to include stakeholders’ ability to react to harmful 
corporate decisions and policies, shareholders will not be served by policies taken at 
stakeholders’ expense.  Just ask the shareholders of British Petroleum and 
Volkswagen.  The potential for unhappy stakeholders is a reality for all businesses, 
and the literature reviewed in this article explains how and why it is in shareholders’ 
best interests to pay attention to stakeholders’ interests and create joint maximum 
value where possible.  Table 1 provides examples of the negative consequences 
that companies have faced as a result of attempts to profit at the expense of 
stakeholders. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In 1984 Freeman argued that it was not only morally correct but an essential 
component of strategic management for companies to take into account the effect of 
their activities on stakeholders.  This article examined the development of 
stakeholder theory in the management literature, and explored who qualifies as a 
stakeholder, how stakeholders gain power and influence, and the conditions under 
which businesses are most likely to find it in their interests to take stakeholders into 
account (stakeholder salience).  The management literature makes clear that a 
failure to consider the effect of corporate decisions and policies on a firm’s 
stakeholders could and likely will lead to harm to the firm, and that accordingly 
competent managers will conduct stakeholder audits and consider how to mitigate 
the risk of adverse stakeholder reactions to corporate decisions as core aspects of 
running the business.  Forging positive relationships with stakeholders is also an 
opportunity to create value.  Lawyers should care about these points because they 
go squarely to the issue of shareholder wealth maximisation and illustrate the 
convergence between shareholder primacy and stakeholder principles in the form of 
Enlightened Shareholder Value (ESV).   
 
Furthermore, because the need to understand and attempt to mitigate the impact of 
corporate decisions on stakeholders is a fundamental component of risk 
management, there is a compelling argument that corporate harm caused by a 
                                                 
109 Hill and Jones, above n 17, at 139. 
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failure to consider the impact of corporate decisions or policies on stakeholder 
interests could constitute a breach of the directors’ duty to act in the best interests of 
the company or even the directors’ duty of care. If directors are expected to take 
certain steps, then it can be argued that the failure to do so is not reasonable.   
 
Corporate social responsibility principles provide further support for the permissibility 
of considering the interests of corporate stakeholders, but do not obviate the growing 
legal risks of failure to do so.  Finally, shareholder primacy theorists’ arguments 
against stakeholder theory of the nature that it lacks a single objective function do 
not speak to ESV but only to the multi-fiduciary model, which this article does not 
argue for.  Stakeholder theory as conceived by our management colleagues is a 
standard management tool and it should be recognised as such when director 
conduct is under legal review. 
 
 
Table 1: Selected examples of harm caused by attempts to gain at the expense 
of corporate stakeholders 
Company    Error Stakeholders’ 
Reactions/Negative 
Consequences for the 
Company 
Volkswagen Dieselgate: Fraudulent scheme 
misrepresenting level of 
automotive emissions 
discovered in September 2015. 
Payment of over $10 billion 
(USD) to United States 
government to settle 
government claims; additional 
sums to be determined to be 
paid to other governments; 
hundreds of lawsuits pending; 
share price remains down 
approximately 50%. 
British 
Petroleum 
Deepwater Horizon: Safety 
breaches and corner cutting at 
Deepwater Horizon oil platform 
lead to 2010 oil well explosion 
causing eleven deaths and 
massive Gulf of Mexico oil spill. 
Over $14 billion (USD) in clean-
up costs; $18.7 billion (USD) in 
fines; additional billions of 
dollars in compensation 
payments to claimants who 
suffered economic loss; ongoing 
reputational damage; share 
price still way below pre-spill 
levels. 
Airlines 
operating in 
the United 
States 
Numerous instances of US 
airlines failing to provide US 
passengers with food, water or 
lavatory access during 
excessive delays on the tarmac 
in some cases longer than 8 
hours. 
Federal government introduction 
of Airline Passenger Bill of 
Rights, specifying maximum limit 
of 3 hours that plane can remain 
on the tarmac for domestic 
flights and 4 hours for 
international flights (of both US 
and foreign carriers); 
requirements that water and 
lavatories remain available, 
compensation provisions for 
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delays and cancellations, etc. 
Enron and 
certain copycat 
competitors 
Manipulation of California’s 
deregulated electricity markets 
in 2000-01. 
Prosecution of perpetrators 
resulting in settlements as large 
as $1.7 billion (USD); re-
regulation of energy markets to 
allow regulator to prevent, 
investigate and prosecute 
market manipulation. 
Global 
garment 
manufacturers 
2013 Bangladeshi factory 
collapse: Allegations of unsafe 
conditions and abuse of 
garment workers in global 
supply chains. 
Negative publicity; consumer 
boycotts; early suggestions to 
attach liability to international 
brands and retailers for abuses 
in the supply chain – may yet 
lead to law changes. 
Manufacturers 
and re-sellers 
of products 
where entity 
has market 
power 
Opportunistic price gouging by, 
eg, pharmaceutical companies 
(eg, Mylan Pharmaceuticals’ 
2016 400% price  increase in 
the cost of EpiPens in the US), 
various Australian retailers 
charging multiples of the price 
charged abroad for everything 
from books to makeup, etc. 
Negative publicity; possible 
competition law consequences; 
possible legal imposition of price 
caps, increasing consumer flight 
to foreign sources of supply (via 
the internet or by travelling 
overseas); legalisation of 
parallel importing in Australia. 
Australian “Big 
4” Banks 
High fees, failure to pass on 
interest rate cuts, etc. 
Negative publicity; threat of 
Parliamentary investigation and 
sanction; consumer flight to 
lesser known competitors, etc. 
Various global 
corporations 
(eg, Apple, 
Google, 
Microsoft, 
Mylan, James 
Hardie) 
Corporate inversions, 
questionable uses of transfer 
pricing, and change of domicile 
to avoid paying tax in high-cost 
jurisdictions. 
Negative publicity; threat of 
government investigations; 
proposals to change tax laws to 
require corporations to pay 
reasonable minimum levels of 
tax to countries where operate 
or have significant revenue. 
 
